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Financial economists have long debated the relative importance of banks and capital markets
for ﬁnancial development. Existing research ﬁnds that both bank-based and market-based systems
have similar eﬀects on the growth rate of industries and ﬁrm investment (Beck and Levine, 2002).
One possible interpretation of this ﬁnding is that banks and capital markets are substitutes and
the absence of one is easily bridged by the other. In other words, the absence of a vibrant stock
market might have little eﬀect on economic growth. Morck et al. (1990) express this colorfully
when they hypothesize the capital markets to be just a ‘sideshow’, not central to ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing or
investment choices. This view of capital markets, however, runs counter to a long held view, ﬁrst
expressed in Keynes (1936), that non-fundamental movements in stock prices can aﬀect a ﬁrm’s
level of investment, and hence, economic growth.
While there are a number of studies looking at whether banks play an independent role in
aﬀecting a ﬁrm’s growth and investments (e.g. Ongena et al., 2003; Khawaja and Mian, 2008),
there is little comparable research looking at the independent role of public equity markets. In
an important study on why ﬁrms go public around the world, Kim and Weisbach (2008) ﬁnd that
public equity markets are a prominent source of ﬁnance; on average, ﬁrms use 28.4 cents of every
dollar raised in an initial public oﬀering (IPO) on capital expenditures and R&D. It is unclear,
however, whether public equity markets serve a unique role not easily served by other sources of
ﬁnance. Answering this question is diﬃcult in that it requires one to isolate shocks to a ﬁrm’s
access to equity markets that does not aﬀect other sources of ﬁnance and is not driven by a change
in investment opportunities.1 In this paper, we try to answer this question by using the collapse
of India’s equity market in 1997, to analyze the importance of public equity markets for a ﬁrm’s
investments and growth in emerging economies. Aiding our identiﬁcation, as we discuss below,
the collapse was conﬁned to the equity market and did not aﬀect ﬁrm’s access to other sources of
1As noted in Baker et al. (2003), just analyzing correlations between stock price movements and investment can
be misleading since these stock price movements likely reﬂect changes in expected cash ﬂows.
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ﬁnance such as bank debt.
Public equity markets may be particularly important source of ﬁnance in emerging economies.
The banking sector in these countries is often dominated by government-owned banks that favor
ﬁnancing large, established, and politically connected ﬁrms (Beck et al., 2005; Borensztein and Lee,
2002; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; La Porta et al., 2002; Morck and Nakamura, 1999). To the extent the
public equity markets are less subject to capture by politicians and large industrial incumbents, they
may provide an attractive source of ﬁnance for small, young ﬁrms with investment opportunities
(Rajan and Zingales, 2003). The concentrated nature of banking markets in these countries may
also increase banks’ ability to extract rents (Rajan, 1992), further increasing the attractiveness of
public equity markets. Public equity markets may also aid the development of a private equity
sector (Black and Gilson, 1998).
Our setting oﬀers a number of unique advantages in assessing the importance of public equity
markets in emerging economies. First, the collapse of India’s equity market in 1997 provides
an exogenous shock to ﬁrms’ access to public equity ﬁnance that is largely unrelated to ﬁrms’
investment opportunities. During the ﬁrst half of our sample period, 1992-1996, India’s equity
market was ‘hot’; over 4,000 ﬁrms went public and more than 200 ﬁrms completed a secondary
equity oﬀering (SEO). But in 1997, both the IPO and the SEO markets collapsed and remained
relatively inactive through 2002. Only 252 IPOs and SEOs were completed between 1997 and 2002.
Helping us isolate a shock to ﬁrm’s access to public equity markets, the collapse was triggered by
a combination of factors largely unrelated to ﬁrms’ investment opportunities: regulatory changes
that made it more diﬃcult for ﬁrms to go public, the withdrawal of foreign portfolio investments
following the Asian ﬁnancial crisis, and the high proﬁle failure of a few public ﬁrms that shook
investor conﬁdence.
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The ﬁnancial turmoil did not appear to originate from or result in any signiﬁcant negative
shocks to the real economy. Overall GDP averaged six percent annual growth both prior to the
fall in the number of equity issues, 1993 to 1996, and afterwards, 1997 to 2000, and outstanding
bank credit grew at an average annual rate of 16.6 percent from 1993 to 1996 and 16.4 percent
from 1997 to 2000. The continued growth of the aggregate economy in the face of the fall in the
number of equity issues reﬂects both the smaller share of the private corporate sector in the Indian
economy and the greater reliance of the non-Government ﬁrms on bank ﬁnancing. Thus, while a
fall in equity issues adversely aﬀected the performance of equity-dependent ﬁrms (as shown later)
and long-run growth (because some small, high-growth ﬁrms may fail to ﬁnd alternative funding
sources), it was not large enough to have a sizable or immediate impact on overall GDP.
The second advantage of our empirical setting is the availability of detailed ﬁrm-level ﬁnancial
data on public and private ﬁrms. Unlike in the U.S., even unlisted ﬁrms in India, are required to ﬁle
ﬁnancial statements with the regulator. The data for private ﬁrms enables us to understand which
types of ﬁrms go public in an emerging economy and to test for diﬀerential responses among ﬁrms
more likely to depend on equity ﬁnancing following the stock market’s collapse. This diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence approach allows us to better isolate the independent role of equity markets and to provide
novel evidence on whether the public equity market aﬀects the ﬁnancing and investment choices of
private ﬁrms. Our data set also includes information on a ﬁrm’s aﬃliation with a business group,
which we use as another proxy for a ﬁrm’s dependence on external equity ﬁnance. An important
caveat about our data set is that it does not include the smallest ﬁrms of the Indian economy. This
is due to the minimum size requirement for inclusion imposed by our data source, Prowess. We
discuss this in greater detail in our Data Section.
The ﬁnal advantage of analyzing India is that although its equity market is large, it is otherwise
similar to other emerging economies. India’s equity market ranked tenth in the world at the end
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of 2007, in terms of market capitalization, and had the largest number of IPOs among countries
studied by Kim and Weisbach (2008).2 Despite the size of its stock market, India’s broader ﬁnancial
system resembles that of many other emerging markets in that it is relatively underdeveloped and
dominated by large, government-owned banks.3 Analyzing the equity market in this environment
is likely to provide general insights on how public equity markets may aﬀect ﬁrm investments and
ﬁnancing choices in other emerging economies.
To analyze whether the equity market collapse aﬀected investment levels and ﬁrms’ performance,
we conduct a battery of tests. We begin by documenting which ﬁrms go public in India, how ﬁrms
utilize the IPO proceeds, and which ﬁrms are able to issue equity after the market’s collapse.
This analysis sheds light on which ﬁrms may be most aﬀected when equity becomes scarce. We
then use multiple proxies to identify public and private ﬁrms that are most likely to depend on
external equity capital and study how their performance and ﬁnancing choices change following the
equity market’s collapse relative to ﬁrms less likely to rely on equity ﬁnance. Observing a relative
deterioration in performance for these ﬁrms after the equity market’s collapse would suggest that
they are unable to replace public equity with alternate sources of ﬁnance.
Our evidence indicates that the public equity markets in India expanded access to ﬁnance
for small, young ﬁrms between 1992 and 1996. Firms that go public prior to the collapse are
smaller, in terms of total sales, and younger, as measured by age since incorporation, relative to
the average private ﬁrm in our sample.4 Firms that go public also appear to have more investment
opportunities relative to ﬁrms that choose to remain private, and ﬁrms appear to use the equity
markets to ﬁnance these growth opportunities. Relative to both other public and private ﬁrms, the
2Source: http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/annual/2007/domestic-market-capitalization.
3Bank credit to GDP was 25% and market capitalization to GDP was 23% (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001),
and government banks accounted for 86.3 percent of bank assets in 1992 (Source: www.rbi.org.in).
4This evidence diﬀers signiﬁcantly from IPO studies in more developed countries such as Italy and Germany
(Pagano et al., 1998; Fischer, 2000).
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ﬁrms that go public exhibit signiﬁcant increases in capital expenditure and sales around the time
of their IPO and reduce their use of expensive forms of ﬁnance such as trade credit.
Small, young ﬁrms’ ability to grow using equity appears to decrease signiﬁcantly after the
equity market’s collapse in 1997. After 1996, only larger, older ﬁrms with greater investment
opportunities and past capital expenditures successfully undertake an IPO. This shift in ﬁrms that
go public suggests that post-1996 the public equity markets were available as a ﬁnancing option
only for the less risky and more established ﬁrms. In many ways, the market structure shifted in
1996 from a hybrid AIM type market,5 where young ﬁrms were able to go public at low cost, to a
more mature NYSE type market, where this was less true.
The equity market’s collapse is associated with weaker performance among private ﬁrms most
likely to depend on external equity capital. We ﬁnd that private ﬁrms with characteristics similar
to pre-1997 IPO ﬁrms, such as young, non-group ﬁrms located in high investment industries, expe-
rience a fall in proﬁt margins, capital expenditure and sales growth, and an increase in bankruptcy
rates after 1996 relative to other private ﬁrms. Private non-group ﬁrms, which do not have access
to a group’s internal capital market, are aﬀected more by the market’s collapse. Given there is
no ex-ante reason for group-aﬃliated and unaﬃliated ﬁrms’ investment opportunities to respond
diﬀerentially to the market’s collapse, this suggests that the decline in growth among private ﬁrms
is due to a shift in access to equity ﬁnance and that the AIM type market that existed in India
prior to 1997 served an important role in enabling young ﬁrms to raise outside equity and grow.
The collapse of the public equity market is also associated with a decline in performance among
public ﬁrms most likely to depend on a secondary equity oﬀering (SEO). Public ﬁrms that resemble
pre-1997 SEO ﬁrms experience a fall in capital expenditure, proﬁt margins and an increase in
leverage following the market collapse relative to other public ﬁrms less likely to do an SEO.
5AIM is the London Stock Exchange’s international market for smaller growing companies.
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Firms that go public immediately prior to the collapse, which are more likely to require follow-on
equity ﬁnancing after the equity market’s collapse, also exhibit sharp declines in sales growth rates,
proﬁtability and increases in leverage beginning in 1997 relative to ﬁrms that went public in earlier
years and are less likely to need follow-on equity ﬁnancing. Consistent with lack of external equity
ﬁnance aﬀecting performance, the fall in sales growth among ﬁrms more likely to depend on equity
ﬁnance is also more severe for ﬁrms from industries that depend more heavily on external ﬁnance,
ﬁrms with lower asset tangibility, and non-group ﬁrms.
Overall, the evidence regarding ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing choices and performance following India’s equity
market’s collapse in 1997 suggests that public equity markets have the potential to expand access
to ﬁnance and foster greater investment in emerging economies. Our ﬁndings also suggest that the
public equity markets may be an important source of ﬁnance in emerging economies, and for many
ﬁrms, they are not always easily replaced by alternate sources of ﬁnance.
Our focus on public equity markets in emerging economies is related to a number of recent
empirical papers. Beck and Levine (2002) ﬁnds evidence that both bank-based and arm’s length
ﬁnancial markets have similar eﬀects on growth, whereas Gormley et al. (2011) provides evidence
that public debt markets can act as a spare tire for bank-based ﬁnancing during a banking crises.
Bekaert et al. (2005) and Henry (2000a, 2000b) ﬁnd evidence that allowing foreign participation in
domestic equity markets may also have beneﬁcial aﬀects for domestic ﬁrms in these economies. Our
paper builds on this existing literature by analyzing how equity markets generally aﬀect a ﬁrm’s
investment, performance, and ﬁnancing choices in emerging economies, and whether equity markets
play an independent role in promoting growth that is not easily replaced by alternate sources of
ﬁnance.
Our focus on India’s equity market collapse is also related to the papers that estimate the
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eﬀect of a banking crisis on bank dependent borrowers (e.g. Ongena et al., 2003; Paravisini, 2008;
Khwaja and Mian, 2008). Unlike these papers, we study how a crisis in the capital markets aﬀects
investments and growth in the corporate sector. Our evidence also highlights which ﬁrms may be
more dependent on equity ﬁnance and how capital markets may provide an important source of
ﬁnance for these particular ﬁrms.
This paper is also related to a growing, but relatively small, empirical literature regarding a
ﬁrm’s decision to go public. The two closest papers are Pagano et al. (1998) and Chemmanur
et al. (2010). Similar to this paper, both papers analyze the going-public decision using ex-ante
characteristics and ex-post performance of the IPO ﬁrms. But unlike this paper, both papers
focus on relatively developed ﬁnancial markets, Italy and the U.S., respectively. Our focus on an
emerging market with an underdeveloped ﬁnancial system helps us understand the role of public
equity markets when the alternate sources of ﬁnance are underdeveloped. Furthermore, the market
collapse in 1997 helps us design sharper tests of whether the public equity market aﬀects the real
economy.6
Finally, this paper is related to two recent papers that also study the Indian IPO market during
the same time period as ours. Bubna and Prabhala (2007) studies the eﬀect of introducing book
building as a method of issuance on pricing of the IPO shares, while Marisetty and Subrahmanyam
(2010) looks at the pricing and subsequent stock performance of group and non-group IPOs.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes India’s economy and public
equity markets during our sample period. Section 2 describes the data, and Section 3 reports our
estimates on which ﬁrms go public in India and their post-IPO performance. Section 4 analyzes
how both public and private ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing choices and performance change following the equity
6Other, but less directly related empirical papers that have looked at the going public decision include Fischer
(2000), Boehmer and Ljungqvist (2004), Bharath and Dittmar (2010) and Aslan and Kumar (2010).
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market’s collapse in 1997. Section 5 discusses some additional tests and robustness checks. Section
6 concludes.
1. India’s Public Equity Market
In April 1992, India’s public equity market was greatly deregulated with the passage of the SEBI
Act. This Act abolished the existing regulator, the Comptroller of Capital Issues, and established
the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) as the new regulatory agency for India’s capital
markets. The initial set of guidelines issued by SEBI allowed almost all ﬁrms to freely price their
IPOs and decide on the size of the issue in consultation with merchant bankers. Only ﬁrms without
a three-year track record of proﬁtability and not belonging to a group with existing proﬁtable ﬁrms
were subject to price controls. These guidelines have since been amended periodically and now go
under the name of “Disclosure and Investor Protection Guidelines.” Prior to 1992, the Comptroller
of Capital Issues controlled the pricing and the size of all the issues allowed and imposed a minimum
proﬁtability track record for ﬁrms to go public.
The easing of regulation made it easier for ﬁrms to access the equity market, leading to a surge
in IPOs and SEOs between 1992 and 1996. 4,368 ﬁrms went public and 218 ﬁrms accessed the SEO
market between 1992 and 1996. Some of India’s fastest growing ﬁrms in the information technology
sector today, such as Infosys Technologies Limited (NASDAQ listed with a market capitalization
of about $30 billion) went public during this period.
In 1997, the volume of IPOs and SEOs signiﬁcantly dropped and remained low for a number of
years. The total number of IPOs reported in SDC Platinum fell from 1,134 in 1996 to 66 in 1997
and the number of SEOs fell from 23 in 1996 to 6 in 1997. This drop in IPO and SEO activity
persisted for a number of years. The number of IPOs and SEOs during the ﬁve year period 1998-
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2002 amounted to 180, an average of 36 per year. This represents a sharp drop from the average
of 990 IPOs and SEOs per year between 1992 to 1996.
The decline in equity issues appears driven by multiple factors. One factor was eﬀorts by the
SEBI to tighten the rules governing which ﬁrms could issue equity. Some of these rules were based
on the recommendations of the Malegam Committee. The rules were put in place between 1995
and 1996 and restricted IPOs to companies with a three year track record of dividend payment
unless the company had its project appraised by a bank that has at least a 10 percent stake in the
project (SEBI, 1997 and 1998). At the same time, companies that wanted to do a SEO that would
increase their equity capital by more than 500 percent now had to satisfy the same criteria as ﬁrms
attempting to do an IPO.7
The second factor that contributed to the decline in equity issues was a collapse in investor
conﬁdence and the supply of equity ﬁnance. There was a signiﬁcant decline in foreign capital
inﬂows following the Asian ﬁnancial crisis of 1997. Foreign institutional investor inﬂows fell from
$3.3 billion in 1996-97 to $1.8 billion in 1997-98 to -$66 million in 1998-99 (SEBI, 2006).8 The foreign
investor outﬂows was also accompanied by an outﬂow of domestic funds from equity markets. The
fraction of equity in household wealth in India fell from 9.5% in 1994-95 to 4.18% in 1996-97. The
domestic outﬂows were primarily driven by a collapse in investors’ conﬁdence which was precipitated
by the discovery of some ‘ﬂy by night’ IPOs in 1995 and 1996 that defrauded investors.9
7There was also a corresponding change in regulation that allowed ﬁrms to make a public debt issuance without
ﬁrst making a public equity issuance. This change, however, does not appear to explain the drop in equity issuances.
Public debt issuances also exhibited a sharp drop in 1997 and did not recover to pre-collapse levels until 2001.
Likewise, we do not see ﬁrms substituting into private placement of equity; private capital issues also declined in
1996-97. See Appendix Table A-I for details on ﬁnancial ﬂows to the private sector during the 1990s, and see Appendix
Table A-II for a complete listing of changes in primary equity market issuance regulations between 1993 and 1998.
8The dates represent ﬁnancial years, which run from April to March in India.
9One of the notable scandals of this period was M.S. Shoes East Limited which went public in September 1992
and whose main promoter, Pavan Sachdeva was arrested in April 1995 and accused of violating SEBI guidelines
and bribing SEBI oﬃcials. Other notable scandals of that period include Rupangi Impex Ltd. (RIL) and Magan
Industries Ltd. (MIL). In both cases, the dominant shareholders were found to be guilty of price manipulation. See
newspaper reports Business Line July 15, 1997, “Funds still at a premium for corporate sector”, and July 5, 1997,
“Why the bourses have gone dry?” for more details on the sudden shift in investor conﬁdence.
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The collapse of the equity market, however, does not appear to originate from any shift in
ﬁrms’ investment opportunities or demand for equity ﬁnance. The turmoil in the equity markets
and regulatory changes were not accompanied by a fall in the growth rate of the manufacturing
sector, bank credit, or the overall economy. Both the manufacturing sector and overall GDP
averaged six percent annual growth rates from 1996 to 2000, and bank loans grew at 16.4 percent.
During the previous four years, these growth rates were 4.2, 4.0 and 16.6 percent respectively. The
equity market collapse had a limited eﬀect on the broader economy because the non-Government
corporate sector comprised a small share of the Indian economy (about 47%). And within these
ﬁrms, more than 50% belong to family owned business group with access to internal equity from
other member ﬁrms. Furthermore, non-Government Indian ﬁrms predominantly access external
ﬁnancing from banks. The total outstanding banking credit at the end of 1995-96 ﬁscal year was
Rs. 2.5 trillion whereas the total amount of money raised from the public equity markets in 1995-96
was Rs. 120 billion, which was only about 1 percent of GDP (Appendix Table A-I).10
Because the equity market’s collapse in 1997 was largely unrelated to ﬁrms’ investment oppor-
tunities or their ability to fund these investments through other sources of ﬁnance, we are able to
isolate a negative shock to ﬁrms’ ability to raise external equity. The collapse hence provides a
relatively clean setting to study whether public equity markets matter for ﬁrm investments and
growth. In particular, a decline in observed investment levels and performance among ﬁrms most
likely to rely on equity ﬁnance after 1997 would suggest that public equity markets are an important
source of ﬁnance for ﬁrms and not easily replaced by alternate sources of capital.
A post-collapse decline in ﬁrm performance, however, could also reﬂect two other possibilities:
10Of course, whether the equity market’s collapse had an immediate eﬀect on aggregate growth is impossible to
know since the counterfactual, GDP growth absent the collapse, is not observed. Moreover, the inability of some
equity-dependent ﬁrms to obtain ﬁnancing after the equity market’s collapse may have long-run eﬀects on growth
that are harder to quantify. For example, some of India’s fastest growing ﬁrms today, such as Infosys Technologies
Limited, ﬁrst went public prior to the market’s collapse. The failure or delay for such ﬁrms to raise ﬁnancing may
have had long-run eﬀects on growth.
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the unraveling of ‘ﬂy-by-night’ ﬁrms that helped contribute to the collapse in investors’ conﬁdence
or the equity market correctly anticipating a decline in future investment opportunities. In Section
5, we do a number of robustness checks to test these two alternative possibilities, but do not ﬁnd
evidence consistent with these explanations. We now describe our data.
2. Description of Data
We use two main sources of data to analyze the impact of India’s equity market collapse. Our ﬁrst
source is a list of IPOs and SEOs by Indian ﬁrms from SDC Platinum. For every Indian IPO and
SEO listed in SDC with an issue date between 1992 and 2002, we collect the ﬁrm name and issue
date. We restrict our sample to the post-1991 period because of the government restrictions on
ﬁrms’ ability to issue equity prior to 1992. We also do not collect IPO and SEO data after 2002
as our ﬁrm-level ﬁnancial data (described below) does not cover ﬁrms after 2002. The 1992 to
2002 window, however, provides us with ﬁve years of pre-collapse data (1992-1996) and six years
of post-collapse data (1997-2002).
Our second data source, Prowess, provides annual ﬁnancial data and other descriptive variables
for ﬁrms, including their industry classiﬁcation, year of incorporation, and group aﬃliation. Com-
piled by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), Prowess is a panel of both listed and
unlisted public limited companies with assets plus sales greater than 40 million Rupees (approx.
$900,000). In India, ﬁrms can be incorporated either as a private limited company or a public
limited company. The key distinction between the two types of incorporation is that the shares of
a private limited company are not freely transferable and there must be less than 50 shareholders
(excluding past and present employees). Therefore, a company that wishes to issue shares widely
to the public and be listed on an exchange must ﬁrst be incorporated as a public limited com-
pany. Because of these restrictions, the majority of the private limited companies are unlikely to
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satisfy the listing requirements of SEBI and hence their exclusion from Prowess is unlikely to aﬀect
the conclusions from our analysis in Section 3. Prowess covers between 2,000 to 6,000 listed and
unlisted ﬁrms each year, and about twenty-ﬁve percent of the ﬁrms are unlisted ﬁrms.
To better capture the subsample of ﬁrms capable of issuing equity, we restrict our sample to only
ﬁrms in Prowess with a book value of total assets greater than Rs. 50 million. SEBI guidelines
stipulate a minimum networth of Rs. 30 million for ﬁrms to go public. Since networth data is
missing for most of our sample ﬁrms, we use the book value of total assets as an alternate sorting
variable. We also drop ﬁrms that are identiﬁed by Prowess as government- or foreign-owned, leaving
between 2,000 and 5,000 domestic ﬁrms in our sample each year.
Using ﬁrm names, we then manually match the SDC data on IPOs and SEOs with our ﬁnancial
data. Of the 4,607 IPOs reported in SDC between 1992 and 2002, we are able to match 2,572 to
Prowess. We believe the main reason for the less than perfect match between SDC and Prowess
is the minimum size requirement imposed by Prowess. Prowess only covers ﬁrms with assets plus
sales greater than Rs. 40 million. Consistent with the unmatched IPOs likely being too small, we
ﬁnd that while we are able to match 63.5% of the IPOs in the largest decile in terms of issue size,
we are only able to match 49.3% of the IPOs in the smallest size decile. Of the 2,572 IPOs that we
are able to match with Prowess, we are able to obtain ﬁnancial data for the year before the IPO
for only 1,405 ﬁrms. Here again, we believe the main reason to be the minimum size stipulation by
Prowess. Because our analysis requires pre-IPO data, the IPOs without pre-IPO data are excluded
from our analysis. We lose an additional 230 IPOs because of our minimum asset size stipulation
resulting in our ﬁnal sample of 1,175 IPOs.11
In Table I, we provide the year-wise distribution of the full sample and the sub-samples of public
11A yearly breakdown of IPOs in SDC along with the matches to Prowess can be found in the online appendix to
the paper.
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ﬁrms, private ﬁrms, IPOs, and SEOs. The number of private ﬁrms in our sample is uniformly
distributed across the years, with around 700 to 1,500 private ﬁrms each year. Prowess does not
actually identify whether a ﬁrm is public or private. While a ﬁrm’s ownership is easy to ascertain
for those that go public during our sample period, we use two methods to identify the ownership
status of all other ﬁrms in our sample. First, we classify a ﬁrm as being public if it reports stock
price data for any of the years during the sample period. Second, we classify ﬁrms as public if they
report having non-zero shareholdings under the category ‘Indian Public Holdings’. This category
includes dispersed holdings by small shareholders and only public ﬁrms are likely to have such
shareholders. Financial data for a large sample of private ﬁrms is one of the novel aspects of our
data and allows us to assess the impact of the equity market collapse on this subset of ﬁrms. We
will use this data to identify the types of private and public ﬁrms likely to use equity ﬁnance and
how these ﬁrms behave following the market’s collapse.
Our ﬁnal sample includes ﬁrm-level ﬁnancial data for 1,175 IPOs and 231 SEOs between 1992
and 2002, and the observed pattern of equity issues captures the equity market collapse in 1997.
Coinciding with the collapse in investor conﬁdence in 1997, the trends in the number of IPOs and
SEOs show a distinct break in 1997. Only 81 ﬁrms in our sample do an IPO between 1997 and
2002 compared to 1,094 between 1992 and 1996. Likewise, only 22 SEOs are completed after 1996
compared to 209 from 1992-1996.
In Table II, we provide descriptive statistics for our sample. Average characteristics of all ﬁrms
are reported in Column (1), and statistics for public and private ﬁrms are reported separately in
Columns (2) and (3). As expected, private ﬁrms are generally smaller in size. The average value
of total assets for the ﬁrms in our sample is Rs. 4.456 billion. (approximately $100 million), while
for private ﬁrms, the average value is just Rs. 806.6 million (approximately $18 million). There are
relatively small diﬀerences in age, proﬁtability, or leverage between public and private ﬁrms, but
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there is some evidence that private ﬁrms have higher average capital expenditures and are more
likely to be aﬃliated with a group.
3. Going Public in India, 1992-2002
Before studying the impact of the equity market’s collapse in 1997, we ﬁrst analyze the average
characteristics of ﬁrms that go public and their post-IPO performance. This analysis helps us
identify which ﬁrms issue equity in India and how the proceeds are used. The ﬁndings also provide
a benchmark for our later analysis on how ﬁrms’ behavior changes when equity ﬁnance becomes
scarce after 1996.
3.1 EX-ANTE CHARACTERISTICS OF IPO FIRMS
We ﬁrst estimate the average characteristics of private ﬁrms that choose to go public relative to all
other private ﬁrms that remain private. To do this, we follow existing literature and estimate the
following model:
IPO푖푡 = 훾푋푖푡−1 + 훿푡 + 휀푖푡 , (1)
where the dependent variable IPO푖푡 is a dummy variable that takes a value one for ﬁrm 푖 at time
푡 if that ﬁrm did an IPO in that year and zero otherwise. Only private ﬁrms are included in
the regression, and following the previous literature that studies ﬁrms’ going public decision, X
is a set of ﬁrm characteristics and includes, Log(Age), Industry Debt/TA, Industry Investment,
and lagged values of Log(Sales) and EBIDTA/TA. We also include an indicator for whether a
ﬁrm is aﬃliated with a domestic group, Group, in our speciﬁcation. 훿푡 represents a set of time
dummies and is included to capture country-level macro eﬀects. The standard errors are corrected
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for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.12
Our results indicate that the IPO market in India was an attractive source of ﬁnance for
proﬁtable, young, and small ﬁrms. As seen in Column (1) of Table III, private ﬁrms that go public
are likely to be smaller in terms of sales, younger, and more proﬁtable relative to the average
private ﬁrm in our sample. The smaller size and younger age of IPO ﬁrms diﬀers from existing
studies of ﬁrms’ going public choice, such as Pagano et al. (1998) and Chemmanur et al. (2010).
These studies ﬁnd that it is usually the older, larger private ﬁrms that go public. One potential
explanation for the diﬀerence is our focus on an emerging market, where the alternate sources of
ﬁnance, such as bank ﬁnance, are less available for small, young ﬁrms.
We also ﬁnd that the ﬁrms that go public are more likely to have investment opportunities
and a greater need for equity ﬁnance. Firms that go public are more likely to be from industries
with greater investment levels [Column (1)] and from industries with higher market to book ratios
[Column (2)], another potential proxy for investment opportunities.13 In Column (3), we repeat
our regression using the Rajan and Zingales (1998) index, R-Z Index, as a measure of a ﬁrm’s
dependence on external ﬁnance and ﬁnd that ﬁrms that go public are more likely to be from
industries that depend on external ﬁnance. Firms that go public in India are also less likely to be
aﬃliated with a business group. Since groups are known to improve their member ﬁrms’ access to
ﬁnance through the internal capital market (Gopalan et al., 2007), this is consistent with the IPO
being an important source of ﬁnance.14 IPO ﬁrms are also less likely to operate in industries where
12Since we are only interested in identifying cross-sectional characteristics of ﬁrms that undertake an IPO, we
do not include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. Including these ﬁxed eﬀects would eliminate our ability to analyze the eﬀect of
characteristics, such as group aﬃliation, that are ﬁxed over time. In later regressions, where we analyze changes in
ﬁrms’ performance, we will include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
13Since the market-to-book ratio is also a measure of the pricing level in an industry, with a higher value indicating
potential over-pricing of ﬁrms in that industry, the positive co-eﬃcient on Industry Market-to-Book may also indicate
market timing by the ﬁrms that go public.
14Given that group ﬁrms are less likely to go public, we test to see if there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the
characteristics of group and non-group ﬁrms that go public. Consistent with group ﬁrms having alternate sources of
capital and going public at a later stage in their life cycle, we ﬁnd that group ﬁrms that go public are older, larger,
and with greater investment opportunities. The estimates can be found in the paper’s online appendix.
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debt ﬁnance is more readily available, as captured by industries with a higher average leverage
ratio.
All of the ﬁndings are robust to alternative speciﬁcations. In Column (4) we repeat our estima-
tion with a Logit model instead of an OLS model, and in Column (5) we repeat our estimation with
Cox proportional hazard model. In both cases, we ﬁnd similar results. To control for the possibility
that our ﬁndings might be driven by promoters of young ﬁrms attempting to cash out and exit the
ﬁrm (rather than to raise external ﬁnancing), we also repeated our analysis after dropping the 44
IPOs in our sample that had a sale of secondary shares at the time of the IPO; the ﬁndings are
robust to excluding these IPOs.15
3.2 POST-IPO PERFORMANCE
In this section, we investigate the post-IPO performance of ﬁrms that go public relative to all
other ﬁrms. Our objective is to understand how ﬁrms that go public use the IPO proceeds, which
will help us understand how these and similar ﬁrms may be aﬀected by the collapse of the equity
market. Speciﬁcally, we estimate the following model:
푦푖푡 = 훽0 +
−1∑
푠=−7
Γ푠Pre-IPO(-s)푖푡 +
10∑
푠=1
Γ푠Post-IPO(s)푖푡 + 훼푖 + 훿푡 + 휀푖푡, (2)
where Pre-IPO(-s) is an indicator that equals one if it is -s years prior to a ﬁrm’s IPO, and Post-
IPO(s) is an indicator that equals one if it is s years following a ﬁrm’s IPO. All ﬁrms, both public
and private, are included in the estimation,16 and since our sample includes at most seven years of
15The estimates can be found in the online appendix to the paper. In unreported tests, we also estimate a model
similar to Chemmanur et al. (2010) by augmenting the speciﬁcation in Column (3) of Table 3 with additional
independent variables that include: market share, lagged sales growth, lagged capital expenditure, industry Herﬁndal
index to proxy for industry competition, asset tangibility, and industry risk as proxied by volatility of sales growth.
Inclusion of these additional variables does not aﬀect the results reported in Table 3, and we ﬁnd that ﬁrms with
higher past capital expenditure, lower asset tangibility and those from industries with greater sales volatility are more
likely to go public. We do not include the additional variables in our baseline speciﬁcation, however, because their
inclusion signiﬁcantly reduces the size of the sample.
16Because ﬁrms that remain private and ﬁrms that are already public are inherently diﬀerent from the ﬁrms that
choose to go public, the appropriate control group to benchmark the performance of newly public ﬁrms against is
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data prior to a ﬁrm’s IPO and ten years of post-IPO data, the model is fully saturated with the year
of going public being the excluded category. The inclusion of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, 훼푖, ensure that each
indicator is estimated using only variation in performance around a ﬁrm’s IPO year relative to all
other ﬁrms, and time dummies, 훿푡, control for country-level trends. Our dependent variables, 푦, are
Capital Expenditure, Log(Sales), Debt/TA, and Trade Credit/Sales. For each dependent variable,
we plot the point estimates of Γ푠 for three years prior to and ﬁve years after the IPO in Figure
1. Five percent conﬁdence intervals, estimated with standard errors clustered at the ﬁrm level are
also reported.
The estimates of Equation (2) suggest that ﬁrms issuing equity subsequently fund new capital
expenditure. As seen in Figure 1, ﬁrms exhibit an increase in capital expenditure one year prior
to going public (푡 = −1) and a dramatic spike in the IPO year. The point estimates for capital
expenditures in the pre- and post-IPO years are signiﬁcantly lower than that in the year of the
IPO (푡 = 0). Firms going public appear to return to a steady-state level of capital expenditure in
about two years after the IPO. While this level is lower than the pre-IPO level, it is comparable
to that of other public ﬁrms. In unreported tests we ﬁnd that both the mean and median level of
capital expenditure for newly public ﬁrms in years 푡 = 2, 3, 4, and 5 are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from that of all other public ﬁrms.17
Sales also grow signiﬁcantly one year after the IPO (푡 = 1) and continue to grow at a faster rate
until about three years after the IPO. The increased growth is economically large. Relative to all
other ﬁrms, ﬁrms going public exhibit a thirty percent higher sales growth in the three years after
their IPO.
unclear. However, we obtain results similar to those reported when we alternatively restrict the control group to only
private or only public ﬁrms.
17Since these speciﬁcations include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, it is not possible to make inferences about the diﬀerences
in levels between IPO ﬁrms and all other ﬁrms directly from the estimates presented in Figure 1. The estimates in
Figure 1 only tell us how ﬁrms that went public trended diﬀerently in the years around their IPO, 푡 = 0, relative to
ﬁrms that did not go public. Since 푡 = 0 is the excluded year, it is set to zero by default.
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The increase in capital expenditure and sales prior to and immediately following the IPO shows
that on average ﬁrms went public in India to raise money to fund investments. Consistent with
this we also ﬁnd that less than 2% of the IPOs during the time period involve sale of secondary
shares. One view of the IPO market development in India is that before the collapse, the market
was predominantly used as an exit vehicle by the promoters of small and young ﬁrms. The less
frequent issue of secondary shares and the increase in capital expenditure and sales during the time
of the IPO are inconsistent with this view.
The estimates presented in Figure 1 also indicate a shift in ﬁnancing sources following an IPO.
We see an immediate decrease in leverage in the year of the IPO – consistent with an infusion
of new equity capital – but a rather quick return to pre-IPO levels. The increase in leverage to
pre-IPO levels, despite a signiﬁcant increase in assets, suggests that ﬁrms are able to successfully
lever up their new equity capital. Trade Credit/Sales is also signiﬁcantly lower for the IPO ﬁrms
in the years following the IPO (푡 > 1). This suggests that the public equity market enables these
ﬁrms to be less reliant on costly trade credit.
In unreported tests we use a model similar to (1) and (2) to estimate which ﬁrms do a SEO
and how ﬁrm performance changes following a SEO. We ﬁnd that similar to an IPO, small, young,
non-group ﬁrms with investment opportunities are more likely to do a SEO. Firms that do an SEO
also have higher average sales and capital expenditure in the year of a SEO, but the sample size is
smaller and the estimates are not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional conﬁdence levels.
4. Collapse of the Equity Market
Our ﬁndings so far indicate that small, young, non-group ﬁrms with investment opportunities are
more likely to issue equity in India, and their behavior after issuing equity is consistent with them
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using the public equity market to fund investment opportunities. We now turn our attention to
determine whether the public equity market plays an independent role in aﬀecting a ﬁrm’s growth
and investments or whether its absence is easily bridged by alternate sources of ﬁnance. We answer
this question by analyzing the eﬀects of the equity market collapse in 1997.
We start by analyzing how private ﬁrms’ performance and ﬁnancing change following the
collapse. First, we analyze whether the characteristics of ﬁrms that go public after 1996 diﬀers
from that of the 1992-1996 period. Shifts in the characteristics of ﬁrms that go public after 1996
will shed light on which private ﬁrms are likely to lose access to equity ﬁnance following the collapse
in investor conﬁdence and the increase in regulatory restrictions. Second, we analyze changes in
investment, ﬁnancing, and proﬁtability of private ﬁrms most likely to be aﬀected by the market
collapse. In particular, we analyze the diﬀerential response of private ﬁrms most likely to have gone
public after 1996 if the equity market had remained strong, as proxied by having characteristics
similar to pre-1997 IPO ﬁrms, and of non-group private ﬁrms, which are more likely to be aﬀected
by the market’s collapse since they do not have access to a group’s internal capital market.
We next analyze how investment, ﬁnancing, and proﬁtability of public ﬁrms changes following
the market collapse. We look at three sets of public ﬁrms. First, we compare the performance of
public ﬁrms with characteristics similar to pre-1997 SEO ﬁrms relative to other public ﬁrms. Second,
similar to our analysis of private ﬁrms, we compare non-group, public ﬁrms to group-aﬃliated,
public ﬁrms. Here again, we expect the market collapse to have a more adverse impact on non-
group, public ﬁrms. Finally, we analyze the performance of ﬁrms that went public immediately prior
to the equity market’s collapse relative to ﬁrms that went public in earlier years of our sample. We
study the newly public ﬁrms because these ﬁrms are more likely to seek follow-on equity ﬁnancing
(Eckbo and Masulis, 1995), and hence, be aﬀected by the equity market’s collapse.
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4.1 WHO GOES PUBLIC AFTER THE COLLAPSE?
As seen in Table I, the number of IPOs decreased dramatically in 1997 with only a few ﬁrms
going public. But who were these ﬁrms? To answer this question, we re-estimate Equation (1)
diﬀerentiating between pre- and post-1996 IPOs. This is done in Column (2) of Table IV, where we
add interactions between Post-1996 IPO, a dummy variable that identiﬁes IPOs that occur after
1996, and ﬁrm characteristics for age, size, and industry investment.18 In Column (1), we report
the results of the regression from Table III for comparison purposes.
The estimates suggest that small and young ﬁrms are less likely to go public after 1996. Firms
that go public after 1996 are, on average, older relative to ﬁrms that go public prior to the market’s
collapse [Table III, Column (2)]. The ﬁnding is also robust to using Logit [Column (3)] and a
Cox proportional hazard model [Column (4)]. Moreover, the combined estimates of Log(Age) and
Log(Age)×Post-1996 IPO suggest that ﬁrms that go public after 1996 are, on average, older than
ﬁrms that remain private. The estimates in Column (4) also indicate that ﬁrms that go public
after 1996 are relatively larger than both ﬁrms that go public prior to 1996 and ﬁrms that remain
private, and all estimates suggest that the ﬁrms going public after 1996 are from industries with
greater investment levels.
These results suggest that after 1996, only well established ﬁrms from industries with high
investment needs go public, and the IPO market’s role as a source of ﬁnance for small, young
ﬁrms was likely diminished. As noted earlier, this shift appears driven by the collapse in investor
conﬁdence, a decline in foreign inﬂows, and regulatory changes rather than any shift in investment
opportunities.19 The absence of the public equity market as a funding source may adversely aﬀect
18In unreported regressions, we estimate a model with a full set of interaction terms, but ﬁnd that none of the
other interactions are statistically signiﬁcant.
19Again, the distribution of ﬁrms going public pre- and post-collapse is unaﬀected by the exclusion of the 44 IPOs
with a coinciding sale of secondary shares. These results are reported in the paper’s online appendix.
20
the performance of small, young private ﬁrms. We now analyze this possibility.
4.2 THE IMPACT ON PRIVATE FIRMS
If the IPO market served an unique role in ﬁrm ﬁnancing, then the cooling of the IPO market and
the subsequent fall in IPO volumes may adversely aﬀect the performance of private ﬁrms that are
otherwise strong candidates to do an IPO. This would happen if these ﬁrms were planning an IPO
prior to the collapse but are no longer able to go public and the proceeds from going public are not
easily replaced by alternate sources of capital. Newspaper articles at the time appear to support
this possibility. In an article from a weekly India Today dated December 31, 1996, it was argued
that “roughly Rs. 5,670 crore (a crore is equal to ten million) worth of projects have been dropped
after SEBI’s acknowledgement card had been received. Based on a market survey, Prime’s Director
Pritivi Haldea estimates that the future of another Rs. 8,300 crore worth of projects is uncertain
but may well be dropped, given the market conditions.”20 The adverse eﬀect of the IPO market’s
collapse may also be worsened if the availability of alternate sources of capital, such as venture
capital, is dependent on the presence of a strong IPO market (Black and Gilson, 1998).
To evaluate this possibility, we analyze the post-collapse change in performance of private ﬁrms
most likely to beneﬁt from a liquid public equity market, as captured by having characteristics
similar to pre-1997 IPO ﬁrms, relative to all other private ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, we estimate the
following equation:
푦푖푡 = 훽0 + 훽1[Prob(IPO)푖 × Post-1996푡] + 훿푡 + 훼푖 + 휀푖푡, (3)
where Prob(IPO)푖 is the estimated probability of a private ﬁrm i going public after 1996, and
Post-1996 is an indicator equal to one for the years 1997 and beyond. The sample is restricted to
20See “Stock Markets: Depressed Sentiments to Prevail Until A Serious Attempt is Made to Kick-Start the Economic
Reforms Process”, India Today, December 31, 1996.
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ﬁrms that remain private through 2002, and standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level.
The coeﬃcient of interest, 훽1, will capture any post-1996 performance shift among likely IPO
candidate ﬁrms relative to less likely IPO candidates. The ﬁrm-level ﬁxed eﬀects will control for
any average diﬀerences across ﬁrms, and the year ﬁxed eﬀects will capture any country-level trends.
The estimation is a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence, and 훽1 will properly estimate the impact of the equity
market’s collapse on these likely IPO candidates if in the absence of the equity market’s collapse,
the post-1996 performance trend of these ﬁrms would be similar to that of other private ﬁrms. This
assumption seems plausible as the equity market’s collapse in late-1996 does not appear to coincide
with any other shift in domestic ﬁnancial policy or economic growth that would diﬀerentially aﬀect
likely IPO ﬁrms.
To identify private ﬁrms likely to beneﬁt from a public equity market, we ﬁrst re-estimate
Equation (1) using IPOs from 1992-1996.21 Our estimates on the likelihood of doing an IPO
are obtained using a ﬁrm’s age, group-aﬃliation, and amount of investment in the ﬁrm’s primary
industry along with industry ﬁxed eﬀects. We do not include any ﬁrm-level ﬁnancial variables in
the new speciﬁcation as we are interested in estimating the impact of the IPO market’s collapse on
these variables.22 The results of this estimation are reported in Column (1) of Table V. As before,
age and group-aﬃliation are negative predictors of going public prior to 1997, whereas operating
in an industry with higher levels of investment is a positive predictor.
Using the coeﬃcient estimates from this model, we predict the yearly probability of going public
for the subset of ﬁrms that are still private by the end of 1996. For each ﬁrm i, we then average its
predicted probability for the years 1992-96 to construct its Prob(IPO). We use the average proba-
21We only estimate ﬁrms’ likelihood of going public after 1996 using data from prior to the equity market’s collapse
because using post-collapse data would cause a potential endogeneity bias. For example, the market’s collapse and
the reduced ability to go public may aﬀect investment in some industries, which would in turn aﬀect our estimate of
Prob(IPO).
22In unreported tests, we ﬁnd that including these variables does not qualitatively aﬀect our subsequent ﬁndings.
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bility of doing an IPO prior to the market’s collapse to avoid spurious correlation between changes
in the probability of going public over time – which is mainly due to changes in average industry
investment and ﬁrm age – and post-collapse changes in a ﬁrm’s performance. Using Prob(IPO),
we then estimate Equation (3) for a variety of performance measures: Sales Growth, Capital Ex-
penditures, Debt/TA, EBIDTA/Sales, and Bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is an indicator variable that
equals 1 in year t if the ﬁrm ﬁles for bankruptcy with the Bureau for Industrial and Financial
Reconstruction (BIFR) and 0 otherwise.23 The results are presented in Table V, Columns (2)-(6).
Private ﬁrms resembling pre-1997 IPO ﬁrms suﬀer relatively larger setbacks after the equity
market’s collapse. The negative coeﬃcient on Prob(IPO) ×Post-1996 in Column (2) indicates a
signiﬁcant fall in the sales growth of these private ﬁrms relative to all other private ﬁrms after
1996. The magnitude of the drop is economically signiﬁcant. A one standard deviation increase
in the probability of doing a IPO is associated with a post-1996 drop in sales growth to 14% from
the sample average of 45%. There is also a fall in capital expenditure [Column (3)], a drop in
proﬁtability [Column (5)], and an increase in the bankruptcy rates of these ﬁrms [Column (6)].
This evidence suggests that the IPO market serves as an important source of capital for these
ﬁrms. There is also evidence that these ﬁrms respond to the market’s collapse by using more debt
[Column (4)], but the lower growth and investment suggest that, at least for these private ﬁrms,
debt and other sources of ﬁnance are not a perfect substitute for the public equity market.24
Since Prowess does not cover the smallest ﬁrms, the eﬀect we document is only for those private
ﬁrms large enough to be covered by Prowess. To the extent the smaller private ﬁrms not covered by
Prowess may have greater information and agency problems and hence greater diﬃculty in accessing
23The BIFR is India’s federal bankruptcy court where ﬁrms subject to the Sick Industrial Company Act of 1985
(SICA) must ﬁle for bankruptcy. SICA governs the vast majority of bankruptcy cases in India since it applies to all
ﬁrms that employ more than 50 workers and have been in operation for over ﬁve years.
24Since our objective is to understand whether the equity market collapse diﬀerentially aﬀected the performance
and ﬁnancing pattern of ﬁrms that resemble pre-1997 IPO ﬁrms, and not necessarily to understand the channel
through which this occurs, we do not estimate a simultaneous equation system.
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alternative sources of external ﬁnance, the eﬀects we document for the relatively larger ﬁrms may
understate the true magnitude of the adverse consequences of the market’s collapse.
The timing of the reduced performance coincides with the equity market’s collapse. Figure
2 plots the point estimates from a modiﬁed version of Equation (3), where we allow the eﬀect
of Prob(IPO) to vary by year. There is no diﬀerence in the growth rates of private ﬁrms that
resemble pre-1997 IPOs as compared to other private ﬁrms prior to the market’s collapse. But
after the collapse, private ﬁrms that resemble pre-1997 IPOs and hence those most likely to beneﬁt
from a strong IPO market tend to grow at a much slower rate than other private ﬁrms. This
diminished growth begins in the year of the collapse and continues for the duration of the sample
time period. The precise timing of the reduced growth suggests that it is less likely to be caused
by any omitted ﬁrm or industry characteristic.
One possible concern with our prior estimates is that they may be driven by changes in ﬁrms’
investment opportunities rather than the collapse of the equity market. This could happen if
the pre-1997 IPOs are clustered in a few industries that experience a reduction in investment
opportunities after 1997. Our data, however, suggests that such industrial clustering is unlikely to
explain our ﬁndings. IPOs occur in 93 of the 119 diﬀerent 3-digit SIC industries captured in our
sample of private and public ﬁrms.
To further exclude this possibility, we next compare the performance of group-aﬃliated and
unaﬃliated private ﬁrms after the equity market’s collapse. This test helps mitigate the above con-
cern for two reasons. First, there is no ex-ante reason to suspect that the investment opportunities
of group and non-group ﬁrms would diﬀerentially change around the time of the equity market
collapse. Second, because of their access to a group’s internal capital market and greater access to
debt capital from banks, group-aﬃliated ﬁrms are likely less dependent on public equity issues for
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ﬁnancing investment, and hence, less likely to be aﬀected by the IPO market’s collapse.25,26
To test the collapse’s diﬀerential eﬀect on non-group ﬁrms, we re-estimate (3) after substituting
Prob(IPO) with Non Group, where Non Group is a dummy variable that identiﬁes ﬁrms unaﬃliated
with business groups. We also include controls for a ﬁrm’s size, Log(Assets), and investment
opportunities, as captured by Industry Investment. The results, reported in Panel B of Table V,
are consistent with the public equity market providing an important source of ﬁnance for non-group
ﬁrms. Relative to group-aﬃliated private ﬁrms, the non-group private ﬁrms exhibit a signiﬁcant
fall in the sales growth [Column (1)], capital expenditures [Column (2)], and proﬁtability [Column
(4)] following the equity market’s collapse in 1996. These results are also economically signiﬁcant.
The results in Column (1) indicate that non-group private ﬁrms have a 29 percentage point lower
sales growth rate as compared to group-aﬃliated private ﬁrms. In comparison, the mean sales
growth rate of private ﬁrms in the sample is 44%.
4.3 THE IMPACT ON PUBLIC FIRMS
In this section, we analyze whether the equity market collapse aﬀected the investment and ﬁnancing
choices of public ﬁrms. As shown in Table I, the SEO market exhibited a sharp decline in activity
after 1996. If the SEO market serves an important role in providing equity ﬁnance for public
ﬁrms, then the collapse of the equity market is likely to aﬀect the performance of public ﬁrms
that depend more heavily on external equity ﬁnance. To analyze this possibility, we estimate the
diﬀerential impact of the equity market’s collapse on public ﬁrms more reliant on external equity
ﬁnance relative to public ﬁrms less reliant on external equity ﬁnance.
25Group-aﬃliated ﬁrms’ weaker dependence on equity ﬁnance is supported by our earlier estimates that show that
such ﬁrms are less likely to go public in India. The greater availability of debt capital for group ﬁrms is also implied
by the results in Gopalan et al. (2007) and by the fact that, ceteris paribus, group ﬁrms in India have higher leverage
ratios.
26Since we use group aﬃliation as one of the variables to identify likely IPO candidates in our tests in Panel A,
our tests in Panel B are not entirely independent of those in Panel A. We still perform these tests to ensure that our
results in Panel A are not solely driven by changes in industry investment opportunities.
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We ﬁrst identify public ﬁrms likely to do a SEO using a model similar to (1) for the sample
period 1992-96. In this case, our dependent variable is a dummy variable that identiﬁes public ﬁrms
that do a SEO in a particular year, SEO. The results of this estimation are reported in Column
(1) of Panel A of Table VI. We ﬁnd that only the extent of investment in a ﬁrm’s industry is a
signiﬁcant predictor of completing a SEO. A ﬁrm’s age and group aﬃliation provide little predictive
power for SEOs [Table VI, Column (1)].27
Using the coeﬃcients from this estimation, we then predict the yearly probability of a public
ﬁrm doing a SEO and calculate the average probability of a ﬁrm undertaking a SEO between 1992
and 1996, Prob(SEO). Using this predicted likelihood of a public ﬁrm doing a SEO as our proxy for
a public ﬁrm’s dependence on external equity ﬁnance, we re-estimate Equation (3) using all public
ﬁrms in our sample after substituting Prob(SEO) in place of Prob(IPO). The results are presented
in Columns (2)-(6) of Panel A of Table VI.
The estimates indicate that public ﬁrms resembling pre-1997 SEO ﬁrms suﬀer relatively larger
setbacks after the equity market’s collapse. The negative coeﬃcient on Prob(SEO)×Post-1996 in
Table VI, Column (2) indicates a signiﬁcant fall in the sales growth rate of these ﬁrms relative to
all other public ﬁrms after 1996. The magnitude of the drop is economically large. A public ﬁrm
with a one standard deviation higher probability of doing a SEO has an average sales growth rate
that is 9 percentage points lower after 1996. In comparison, the median sales growth rate among
public ﬁrms in our sample is 12%. There is also a decrease in capital expenditure [Column 3], an
increase in leverage [Column (4)], and a drop in proﬁtability [Column (5)]. These ﬁndings strongly
suggest that the SEO market served as an important source of capital for some public ﬁrms in
27In unreported tests we ﬁnd that when we employ a hazard model, we ﬁnd that similar to our IPO results, young
ﬁrms not aﬃliated with a business group are more likely to do a SEO. We believe the lack of signiﬁcance of these
covariates in the linear probability model may be because of the fewer SEOs as compared to IPOs in our sample. We
have 231 SEOs as compared to 1,175 IPOs. We compensate for the poor prediction of our SEO model by performing
additional tests using alternate ex-ante proxies for a public ﬁrm’s dependence on external equity. These results are
reported in Sections 4.4 and 5.
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India, and despite an attempt by ﬁrms to substitute into using more debt, the adverse turn in the
market had a negative impact on the performance of ﬁrms most likely to tap the equity market.28
We next compare the performance of ﬁrms aﬃliated with business groups with unaﬃliated ﬁrms.
These tests help ensure that our earlier results are not driven by changes in the industry investment
opportunities that coincide with the SEO market collapse. Since group ﬁrms have access to their
internal capital market and better access to bank ﬁnance, we expect group ﬁrms to be aﬀected less
by the collapse of the SEO market. To test this, we re-estimate (3) after substituting Prob(SEO)
with Non Group, a dummy variable that identiﬁes non-group ﬁrms, and adding 퐿표푔(퐴푠푠푒푡푠) and
퐼푛푑푢푠푡푟푦 퐼푛푣푒푠푡푚푒푛푡 as additional controls.
The results in Panel B of Table VI suggest that non-group, public ﬁrms were aﬀected more
by the adverse turn in the equity market. The negative coeﬃcient on Non Group×Post-1996 in
Column (1) indicates that there is a signiﬁcant fall in the sales growth rate of unaﬃliated ﬁrms
relative to group-aﬃliated ﬁrms. There is also a relatively larger fall in the capital expenditure
levels of these ﬁrms [Column (2)] and a relatively larger drop in proﬁtability [Column (4)].
4.4 THE IMPACT ON NEWLY PUBLIC FIRMS
Another set of public ﬁrms likely to be disproportionately aﬀected by the equity market’s collapse
are newly public ﬁrms, which are more likely to do follow-on equity oﬀerings (Eckbo and Masulis,
1995) than other public ﬁrms. If the newly-public ﬁrms are not able to replace the planned SEOs
with other sources of capital, then their performance may be adversely aﬀected.
An upward shift in bankruptcies among newly public ﬁrms after 1996 provides some preliminary
evidence that SEO market collapse adversely aﬀected these ﬁrms. This is seen in Table VII, where
28In an unreported test similar to the one reported in Figure 2, we also check to ensure there is no pre-existing
diﬀerential trend prior to 1997 among public ﬁrms most likely to be adversely aﬀected by the markets’ collapse in
1997. The estimates conﬁrm that the decline in performance among the ﬁrms most likely to do a SEO does not begin
to occur until 1997. These estimates are available from the authors upon request.
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we tabulate the yearly number of bankruptcies among ﬁrms that go public before 1996. In 1996,
one percent of these newly public ﬁrms went bankrupt, and in 1997 this rate nearly doubled to 1.85
percent. In 1998, the rate doubled again to 3.97 percent.
To formally analyze the impact of the SEO market’s collapse on newly public ﬁrms, we exploit
diﬀerences in the timing of a ﬁrm’s IPO to proxy for a ﬁrm’s SEO demand after the collapse. A
ﬁrm that goes public early, say in 1992 (hereafter the ‘early’ IPO ﬁrm), is likely to have already
executed any planned SEOs by 1997 and is less likely to be aﬀected by the equity market’s collapse
relative to a ﬁrm that goes public later, say in 1995 (hereafter the ‘later’ IPO ﬁrm). To estimate
the eﬀect of the equity market’s collapse on the newly public ﬁrms, we test for post-1996 diﬀerences
in the performance trend of the later IPO ﬁrms relative to the early IPO ﬁrms. Our approach will
thus employ a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation, with an identifying assumption that, absent the
equity market’s collapse, the trend in the post-IPO performance of the later IPO ﬁrms should be
similar to that of the early IPO ﬁrms.
To implement this diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach, we estimate a ﬁxed eﬀects model similar to
Equation (2) that includes all ﬁrms that remain private or public during the sample period and all
ﬁrms that go public between 1992 and 1996.29 However, we now make two changes. First, to reduce
the number of estimated coeﬃcients, without aﬀecting the conclusions, we simplify the earlier model
to include just an indicator for performance in the year of the IPO and three indicators for post-
IPO performance. Second, and most importantly, we allow for a change in post-IPO performance
after 1996. This will be our test of whether the collapse of the public equity market aﬀected the
29We exclude the ﬁrms that go public between 1996-2002. We do this to simplify our speciﬁcation and reduce the
number of control variables. Since the post-IPO performance of these ﬁrms is likely diﬀerent from the pre-1997 IPOs,
including them in the sample would require adding controls for their potentially diﬀerent post-IPO performance. In
unreported tests, we repeat the tests after including these ﬁrms and additional control variables and obtain results
similar to the ones reported in Table VIII.
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performance of the later IPO ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, we estimate the following model:
푦푖푡 =
⎛⎜⎜⎝ 훽0 +
∑2
푠=0 Γ푠Post-IPO(s)푖푡 + Γ3Post-IPO(3+)푖푡
+훾[Post-IPO(1+)푖푡 × Post-1996 푡] + 훼푖 + 훿푡 + 휀푖푡
⎞⎟⎟⎠ , (4)
where Post-IPO(s) is an indicator that equals one if it is s years since the IPO, Post-IPO(s+) is
an indicator that equals one if it is s or more years since the IPO, and Post-1996 is an indicator
equal to one for years after 1996. We include both ﬁrm and year ﬁxed eﬀects and cluster standard
errors at the ﬁrm level.
To summarize, the ﬁrst line of this equation estimates average changes in the performance of
ﬁrms in the year of the IPO, one year after, two years after, and three or more years after the IPO
relative to pre-IPO years and changes for all other ﬁrms.30 The second line of the equation tests
for a post-1996 shift in the performance of ﬁrms that go public on or before 1996. This shift will be
captured by 훾. Since we directly control for the predicted path of ﬁrms’ post-IPO performance and
exclude ﬁrms that go public after 1996, 훾 will be estimated only using variation in the timing of the
pre-1997 IPOs. In other words, the coeﬃcient will capture any shift in the post-IPO performance
after 1996 of the later IPO ﬁrms relative to the post-IPO performance of early IPO ﬁrms. The
results are reported in Table VIII.
The evidence indicates that the later IPO ﬁrms exhibit a signiﬁcant decrease in their sales
growth after the market’s collapse in 1996 relative to the earlier IPO ﬁrms. In Column (1) of Panel
A, we just include the indicators for post-IPO performance for comparison with our earlier results.
Consistent with the results in Figure 1, we see that sales increases at a faster rate for IPO ﬁrms
beginning one year after the IPO and continues to increase for up to three years after the IPO, at
which time it levels oﬀ at the higher level. In Column (2), we allow the post-IPO performance to
30This estimation is similar to that of Equation (2), but with fewer indicator variables. We do this to reduce the
number of parameters to be estimated.
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vary after 1996 by including Post-IPO(1+)×Post-1996 in the regression. The negative co-eﬃcient
on Post-IPO(1+)×Post-1996 indicates a signiﬁcant drop in sales after 1996 for the later IPO ﬁrms.
The drop is also economically large in magnitude. The later IPO ﬁrms experience a 9.5 percentage
points slower sales growth rate after 1996 as compared to the early IPO ﬁrms.
To illustrate these results further, in Figure 3 we plot the implied post-IPO changes in Log(Sales)
for ﬁrms that go public in 1992 and 1995. The 1992 IPO line plots the estimated values of Γ0, Γ1,
Γ2, and Γ3 from Equation (4) (see Column (2) of Table VIII), and represents the post-IPO change
in Log(Sales) for a ﬁrm that goes public in 1992. The 1995 IPO line, plots the estimated path
for a ﬁrm that goes public in 1995. The gap between the two lines is a measure of the change in
post-IPO performance of a 1995 IPO after the market’s collapse relative to a 1992 IPO. This shift
is captured by the coeﬃcient 훾 from Table VIII, Column (2).
Beyond experiencing slower sales growth following the equity market’s collapse, the later IPO
ﬁrms also exhibit elevated post-IPO debt levels, reduced proﬁtability, and increased bankruptcy
rates relative to early IPO ﬁrms. The increased leverage [Table VIII, Panel A, Column (4)] suggests
that the later IPO ﬁrms rely more heavily on debt ﬁnance following the collapse of the SEO market.
The increased use of debt, however, does not appear to provide a complete substitute for equity
ﬁnance. The post-IPO proﬁtability of the later IPO ﬁrms is lower following the market’s collapse
[Table VIII, Panel B, Column (2)], and bankruptcy rates are 4.5 percentage points higher [Column
(4)]. Together, these indicate that the later IPO ﬁrms are adversely aﬀected by the market’s
collapse.
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5. Robustness Checks and Additional Tests
To summarize, the investment and performance of both private and public ﬁrms more likely to rely
on external equity ﬁnance decline relative to their public and private counterparts after the equity
market’s collapse. Private ﬁrms that resemble pre-1997 IPO ﬁrms exhibit large drops in capital
expenditures and proﬁtability relative to other private ﬁrms after 1996. Public ﬁrms that resemble
pre-1997 SEO ﬁrms, non-group ﬁrms and ﬁrms that go public just before the equity market’s
collapse also experience large drops in performance relative to other public ﬁrms. The timing of
the observed changes also coincide with the equity market collapse.
The identifying assumption behind our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates is that, absent the
market’s collapse, the performance trend of the ﬁrms more dependent on external equity ﬁnance
will be similar to that of the ﬁrms less dependent on external equity ﬁnance. The ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects
control for time-invariant diﬀerences across ﬁrms, and the time ﬁxed eﬀects control for country-level
shifts in investment and growth.
This assumption could be violated, however, if some factor unrelated to the equity market, such
as a new technology or change in consumer demand, disproportionately aﬀects the performance of
equity dependent ﬁrms. In this case, the equity market collapse may actually be in anticipation of
the future negative shocks to those ﬁrms’ investment opportunities.
While it is not possible to fully exclude such a possibility, we have three pieces of evidence
that go against this explanation. First, the shear magnitude and suddenness of the drop in the
number of equity issues from 1996 to 1997 goes against the alternate explanation of learning about
diminished investment opportunities. Such changes in investment opportunities and the market’s
awareness about the changes are likely to occur more gradually. Second, as noted, both overall
GDP and bank credit continued to grow strongly after 1996. Overall GDP averaged six percent
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annual growth both prior to the equity market’s collapse, 1993 to 1996, and afterwards, 1997 to
2000, and outstanding bank credit grew at an average annual rate of 16.6 percent from 1993 to
1996 and 16.4 percent from 1997 to 2000. This makes it unlikely that investment opportunities
would suddenly disappear for such a large sector of the economy especially among ﬁrms more likely
to rely on outside equity ﬁnance. Third, our evidence indicates that at least some of the equity
dependent ﬁrms increase their use of debt following the equity market’s collapse, highlighting their
need to ﬁnance investment opportunities.
Our evidence pertaining to newly public ﬁrms in Section 4.4, however, could be consistent with
yet another explanation. Since our estimates are obtained by comparing the post-IPO performance
of ﬁrms that went public immediately prior to the equity market’s collapse to the post-IPO perfor-
mance of ﬁrms that went public in earlier years, one possible explanation for this particular result
is that the later IPO ﬁrms are of poor quality as compared to the early ones. For example, the later
IPO ﬁrms could consist of more ‘ﬂy-by-night’ operators that took advantage of investor optimism
and defrauded investors.
We perform two additional tests to help rule out this alternative explanation. First, we repeat
our analysis in Table VIII using only IPO ﬁrms with more than two years of pre-IPO ﬁnancial data
and with older ﬁrms incorporated prior to 1991. Our results are similar in these subsamples which
strongly suggests that the post-collapse decline in performance is not driven by the unraveling of
’ﬂy-by-night’ ﬁrms as these ﬁrms are unlikely to have more than two years of pre-IPO ﬁnancial data
or be incorporated prior to 1991. Second, we repeat our estimates of (4) for Log(Sales) after further
dividing the sample of ﬁrms based on external ﬁnance needs, asset tangibility, and group-aﬃliation.
If the inability to raise outside ﬁnance contributed to the post-1996 shift in performance of the later
IPO ﬁrms, then we should expect the eﬀects to be stronger for ﬁrms with more external ﬁnance
needs, ﬁrms with fewer tangible assets to pledge as collateral for debt, and non-group ﬁrms that
32
do not have access to a group’s internal capital market. The alternative explanations do not have
similar predictions.31
Consistent with the equity market collapse adversely aﬀecting equity-dependent newly public
ﬁrms, the estimates reported in Table IX indicate that the post-1996 decline in sales is stronger
among later IPO ﬁrms with greater external ﬁnance needs. In Table IX, Column (1), we report the
earlier estimation using the entire sample [see Table VIII, Column (2)]. In Table IX, Column (2),
we repeat this earlier estimation but restrict our sample to ﬁrms in the bottom third of the R-Z
Index, and in Column (3), we only include ﬁrms in the top third. The estimates indicate that the
post-1996 decline in sales among later IPO ﬁrms is primarily driven by ﬁrms with greater external
ﬁnance needs. As seen in Column (3), later IPO ﬁrms with greater external ﬁnance needs had, on
average, 12% lower sales growth in the post-IPO period as compared to earlier IPO ﬁrms that also
had greater external ﬁnance needs. In comparison, the growth rate of later IPO ﬁrms with less
external ﬁnance needs is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that of earlier IPO ﬁrms with less external
ﬁnance needs [Column (2)].
In Columns (4) and (5), we repeat the analysis after dividing the ﬁrms based on the tangibility
of their assets. Again, we ﬁnd that the post-1996 decline in sales is larger, on average, among the
later IPO ﬁrms with fewer tangible assets. In Columns (6) and (7), we ﬁnd that the drop is sales for
the later IPO ﬁrms occurs primarily among non-group ﬁrms. While the estimates are noisy and the
diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels (see row titled Δ Post-IPO (1+) ×
Post-1996 ), they are suggestive that the decline in post-IPO performance for the later IPO ﬁrms
is driven in part by the equity market’s collapse and the inability to raise follow-on ﬁnance.
Overall, these additional tests suggest that the adverse performance of ﬁrms following the equity
market’s collapse in 1996 is not just the “unravelling” of the ’ﬂy-by-night’ that went public prior
31These additional tests are reported in the paper’s online appendix.
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to 1996 or the exclusion of new ‘ﬂy-by-night’ ﬁrms from going public after 1996. Even ﬁrms with
established track records but otherwise similar characteristics to ﬁrms issuing equity prior to the
collapse decrease investment and growth following the collapse, and this is particularly true among
ﬁrms with greater dependence on external ﬁnancing. Moreover, while there were certainly some
‘bad apples’ in India’s hot IPO market of 1992-1996, many of the ﬁrms going public during this
period went on to be quite successful. Of the 1,094 ﬁrms that went public between 1992 and 1996
and are captured in our data, at least 673 were still operating 10 years later in 2006, and accounted
for over 11 percent of total sales in their respective industries.
6. Concluding Remarks
Are public equity markets important for a ﬁrm’s growth and investments in emerging economies?
Answering this question is diﬃcult because any observed correlation between stock price changes
and a ﬁrm’s investments may be due to a shift in investment opportunities rather than a change in
a ﬁrm’s access to equity ﬁnance. Using detailed ﬁrm-level data on both private and public ﬁrms, we
circumvent this problem by analyzing the sudden collapse of India’s equity market in 1997, which
was driven by a shift in regulations and investor conﬁdence largely unrelated to ﬁrms’ investment
opportunities. Following the equity market’s collapse, small, young ﬁrms’ ability to issue equity
appears to decrease signiﬁcantly, and only larger, older ﬁrms with greater investment opportunities
and past capital expenditures successfully issue equity. This shift in market structure suggests that
post-1996 the public equity markets were available as a ﬁnancing option only for the less risky and
more established ﬁrms.
Similar to banking crises, an equity market collapse appears to have important implications
for the growth and investment of ﬁrms. Our ﬁndings suggest that both public and private ﬁrms
in India were adversely aﬀected by the collapse of the equity market, but some ﬁrms appeared
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particularly sensitive to the absence of a strong IPO and SEO market. We ﬁnd that newly public
ﬁrms, non-group ﬁrms, young ﬁrms, ﬁrms with few intangible assets, and ﬁrms with greater needs
for external ﬁnance exhibit larger average drops in growth, investment, and proﬁtability following
the equity market’s collapse.
Overall, the evidence regarding ﬁrms’ performance following India’s equity market’s collapse in
1997 suggests that public equity markets have the potential to expand access to ﬁnance and foster
greater investment in emerging economies. Our ﬁndings also suggest that the public equity markets
may be an important source of ﬁnance in emerging economies, and for many ﬁrms, they are not
always easily replaced by alternate sources of ﬁnance. Regulations and institutions that facilitate
equity ﬁnancing for small, young ﬁrms, such as the AIMs exchange in London, may play a unique
and important role in the growth of these ﬁrms.
These ﬁndings raise an important question; why do some ﬁrms appear to be more ‘equity
dependent’ than others? While there is a large empirical literature exploring the ‘uniqueness’ of
banks and the existence of ‘bank-dependent’ ﬁrms, there is relatively little evidence as to what
makes some ﬁrms more equity dependent despite many theories that highlight the costs of debt
and bank ﬁnance (e.g., Rajan, 1992, and Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Our evidence shows that
equity markets may be a particularly attractive source of ﬁnance for small, young, non-group ﬁrms
in emerging markets. Exploring what makes equity markets ‘unique’ in providing ﬁnance for such
ﬁrms is an area ripe for investigation.
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Figure 1: Post-IPO Performance
Each ﬁgures plots the point estimates from a separate OLS regression with interaction terms for each year relative to the year
a ﬁrm goes public, with the year of the IPO being the excluded category (year = 0). While the model was fully saturated,
only point estimates for three years prior and ﬁve years after the IPO are reported. The regression also included both year and
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. The four dependent variables used are: Log(Sales), Capital Expenditure, Debt/TA, and Trade Credit/Sales.
The IPO data is from SDC while the ﬁnancial data is from the Prowess database. The sample includes all non-Government
and non-foreign ﬁrms from Prowess for the years 1992-2002. The standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level, and gray lines
represent the 95 percentile conﬁdence intervals.
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Figure 2: IPO Market Collapse and Private Firms’ Sales Growth by Year
This ﬁgure reports the point estimates of a panel regression that investigates the diﬀerential change in sales growth
after the equity market’s collapse for private ﬁrms that are more likely to beneﬁt from a strong IPO market relative
to private ﬁrms that are less likely to rely on equity-ﬁnancing. This speciﬁcation is the same as that reported in
Table V, Panel A, Column (2) except that the eﬀect of Prob(IPO) is now allowed to vary by year. Ninety-ﬁve percent
conﬁdence intervals, adjusted for clustering at the ﬁrm level, are also plotted.
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Figure 2: Estimating the Impact of the Equity Market Collapse on Newly Public Firms 
This figure illustrates the underlying idea behind the estimation of equation (4), where we attempt to 
identify the impact of the public equity market’s collapse on newly public firms.  The figure plots the 
point estimates from the estimation of equation (4) when we use Log(Sales) as the dependent variable.  
The 1992 IPO line represents estimated post-IPO change in Log(Sales) for a firm that goes public in 1992 
relative to that of all other firms.  In equation (4), this estimated change is captured by 0 1 2, , ,Γ Γ Γ and 3Γ , 
and reported in Column (2) of Table XIII.  Similar to our earlier results, we find an increase in Log(Sales) 
beginning one year after going public that begins to level off at a higher level three years after going 
public.  In the 1995 IPO line, we plot the estimated path for a firm that goes public three years later in 
1995.  In estimating equation (4), the post-IPO performance of the 1995 IPO is allowed to vary from that 
of earlier IPOs after the equity markets collapse in late 1996.  This potential shift in post-IPO performance 
relative to the post-IPO performance of earlier IPOs is captured by the coefficient, γ ,  The negative 
estimate for γ  found in Table XIII, Column (2), indicates a drop in the Log(Sales) of the later IPOs after 
1996 relative to what we observed among firms that went public earlier.  
 
Figure 3: Estimating the Impact of the Equity Market Collapse on Newly Public Firms
This ﬁgure illustrates the underlying idea behind the estimation of equation (4), where we attempt to identify the
impact of the public equity market’s collapse on newly public ﬁrms. The ﬁgure plots the point estimates from the
estimation of equation (4) when we use Log(Sales) as the dependent variable. The 1992 IPO line represents estimated
post-IPO change in Log(Sales) for a ﬁrm that goes public in 1992 relative to that of all other ﬁrms. In equation (4),
this estimated change is captured by Γ0, Γ1, Γ2, and Γ3, which are reported in Column (2) of Table XIII. Similar to
our earlier results, we ﬁnd an increase in Log(Sales) beginning one year after going public that begins to level oﬀ at a
higher level three years after going public. In the 1995 IPO line, we plot the estimated path for a ﬁrm that goes public
three years later in 1995. In estimating equation (4), the post-IPO performance of the 1995 IPO is allowed to vary
from that of earlier IPOs after the equity markets collapse in late 1996. This potential shift in post-IPO performance
relative to the post-IPO performance of earlier IPOs is capt red by the coeﬃcient, 훾. The negative estimate for 훾
found in Table XIII, Column (2), indicates a drop in the Log(Sales) of the later IPOs after 1996 relative to what we
observed among ﬁrms that went public earlier.
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Table I: Sample Distribution
This table reports the year-wise distribution of public ﬁrms, private ﬁrms, IPOs, and SEOs in our sample. Column
(1) provides the number of all ﬁrms, while Columns (2)-(3) break down the sample between public and private ﬁrms.
Columns (4) and (5) provide the number of IPOs and SEOs respectively.
Sample Distribution
Full Sample Public Firms Private Firms IPOs SEOs
1992 1,955 1,333 622 62 20
1993 2,468 1,612 856 137 44
1994 3,201 2,078 1,123 343 59
1995 3,988 2,815 1,173 393 63
1996 4,361 3,375 986 159 23
1997 4,396 3,480 916 6 6
1998 4,406 3,344 1,062 4 1
1999 4,646 3,340 1,306 9 0
2000 4,873 3,346 1,527 56 1
2001 4,158 2,904 1,254 6 4
2002 2,537 1,850 687 0 10
Total 40,989 29,477 11,512 1,175 231
Table II: Descriptive Statistics
This table reports descriptive statistics for our sample of ﬁrms. The ﬁrst column reports averages for the entire sample
while the second and third columns report averages for public and private ﬁrms only. The standard deviations are
reported in parentheses. Total Assets is the book value of total assets in units of Rs. 10 million. Age is the number of
years since incorporation. Group is a dummy variable that takes a value 1 for ﬁrms that belong to a business group.
CapEx/TA is the ratio of the investment in property plant and equipment to the book value of gross ﬁxed assets.
EBITDA/TA is the ratio of earnings before interest depreciation taxes and amortization to total assets. Debt/TA is
the ratio of book value of total borrowing to the book value of total assets. The sample includes all non-Government
and non-foreign ﬁrms with assets greater than Rs. 50 million from Prowess for the years 1992-2002.
All Firms Public Firms Private Firms
Total Assets (TA) 445.6 588.13 80.66
(4,245) (4,996) (297.7)
Age 21.2 21.5 20.6
(20.6) (20.5) (20.6)
Group 0.423 0.400 0.481
(0.494) (0.490) (0.500)
CaPex/TA 0.185 0.161 0.259
(0.364) (0.319) (0.467)
EBITDA/TA 0.104 0.102 0.110
(0.110) (0.109) (0.114)
Debt/TA 0.389 0.398 0.365
(0.315) (0.321) (0.298)
Number of Observations 40,989 29,477 11,512
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Table III: Who Goes Public?
This table reports the results of regressions investigating which ﬁrms go public. Speciﬁcally, we estimate the panel
regression: 푦푖푡 = 훽0 + 훽1푋푖푡 + 훾Controls +Year Fixed Eﬀects, where 푦 is a dummy variable that takes a value 1 in
the year in which a ﬁrm goes public and 0 otherwise. 푋 is a vector of ﬁrm characteristics. Sales is the total sales in
units of Rs. 10 million. Age is the number of years since incorporation. EBIDTA/TA is the ratio of earnings before
interest depreciation taxes and amortization to total assets. Group is a dummy variable that takes a value 1 for ﬁrms
that belong to a business group. Industry Investment is the median investment by all ﬁrms in an industry, where
investment is capital expenditures scaled by total assets. Industry Market-to-Book is the median ratio of market value
of total assets to book value of total assets of all ﬁrms in an industry. RZ-Index is a measure of the external-ﬁnance
dependence of a ﬁrm. It is measured using the methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998). The IPO data is from
SDC while the ﬁnancial data is from the Prowess database. The sample includes all non-Government and non-foreign
private ﬁrms with assets greater than Rs. 50 million from Prowess for the years 1992-2002. Columns (1)-(3) report
OLS estimates, Column (4) reports estimates from a Logit model, and Column (5) reports estimates from a Cox
proportional hazard model. The standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical
signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
OLS Logit Hazard
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log(Sales)푡−1 -.012∗∗∗ -.013∗∗∗ -.018∗∗∗ -.136∗∗∗ -.016
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.030) (.016)
Log(Age)푡 -.059
∗∗∗ -.064∗∗∗ -.067∗∗∗ -.913∗∗∗ -.366∗∗∗
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.056) (.032)
EBIDTA/TA푡−1 .073∗∗∗ .084∗∗∗ .118∗∗∗ 1.692∗∗∗ .942∗∗∗
(.022) (.022) (.026) (.435) (.256)
Industry Debt/TA푡 -.064
∗∗∗ -.098∗∗∗ -.173∗∗∗ -2.390∗∗∗ -.956∗∗∗
(.023) (.024) (.034) (.427) (.228)
Group -.084∗∗∗ -.088∗∗∗ -.080∗∗∗ -1.284∗∗∗ -.705∗∗∗
(.005) (.005) (.006) (.103) (.072)
Industry Investment푡 .540
∗∗∗ 1.641∗∗∗ .500∗∗∗
(.056) (.405) (.175)
Industry Market-to-Book푡 .067
∗∗∗
(.014)
RZ-Index .024∗∗∗
(.009)
Year Fixed Eﬀects X X X X X
Obs. 8932 8896 7000 8290 8932
푅2 of Pseudo 푅2 .295 .282 .268 .414 .083
43
Table IV: Going Public Decision – Pre and Post 1996
This table reports the results of regressions investigating how the going public decision varies across the pre- and
post-1996 period. Speciﬁcally, in Column (1), we estimate the OLS regression: 푦푖푡 = 훽0 + 훽1푋푖푡 + 훾Controls +Time
FE, where 푦 is a dummy variable that takes a value 1 in the year in which a ﬁrm goes public and 0 otherwise. 푋 is
a vector of ﬁrm characteristics that include Log(Sales), Log(Age), EBITDA/TA, Industry Debt, Industry Investment,
and Group. In Column (2), we add interaction terms between Post-1996 IPO, a dummy variable that takes a value 1
for ﬁrms that go public after 1996, and Log(Sales), Log(Age), and Industry Investment. The IPO data is from SDC
while the ﬁnancial data is from the Prowess database. The sample includes all non-Government and non-foreign
private ﬁrms from Prowess for the years 1992-2002. Columns (1)-(2) report OLS estimates, Column (3) reports
estimates from a Logit model, and Column (4) reports estimates from a Cox proportional hazard model. Standard
errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
OLS Logit Hazard
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Sales)푡−1 -.012∗∗∗ -.013∗∗∗ -.191∗∗∗ -.049∗∗∗
(.002) (.001) (.033) (.017)
Log(Age)푡 -.059
∗∗∗ -.055∗∗∗ -.880∗∗∗ -.385∗∗∗
(.003) (.003) (.060) (.034)
EBIDTA/TA푡−1 .073∗∗∗ .055∗∗∗ 1.399∗∗∗ .887∗∗∗
(.022) (.021) (.444) (.255)
Industry Debt/TA푡 -.064
∗∗∗ -.017 -1.673∗∗∗ -.541∗∗
(.023) (.022) (.471) (.234)
Industry Investment푡 .540
∗∗∗ .431∗∗∗ .816∗∗ .174
(.056) (.056) (.411) (.181)
Group -.084∗∗∗ -.079∗∗∗ -1.241∗∗∗ -.695∗∗∗
(.005) (.005) (.108) (.074)
Post 1996 IPO × Log(Sales)푡−1 -.006 .218 .167∗∗
(.022) (.192) (.084)
Post 1996 IPO × Log(Age)푡 .108∗∗ 1.763∗∗∗ .660∗∗∗
(.045) (.355) (.180)
Post 1996 IPO × Industry Investment푡 1.090∗∗∗ 5.177∗∗ 2.454∗∗∗
(.260) (2.368) (.880)
Year Fixed Eﬀects X X X X
Obs. 8932 8932 8290 8932
푅2 or Pseudo 푅2 .295 .318 .46 .093
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Table VII: Bankruptcies Among Newly Public Firms
This table reports the year-wise distribution of IPOs and ﬁrm bankruptcies among the newly public ﬁrms in our
sample. The ﬁrst column gives the total number of IPOs, the second column the number of newly public ﬁrms, the
third column the number of bankruptcies among the newly public ﬁrms and the last column the fraction of newly
public ﬁrms declaring bankruptcy of the subset of newly public ﬁrms found in the Prowess database. The IPO data
is from SDC while the bankruptcy data is from India’s Bureau of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR).
The sample includes all non-Government and non-foreign ﬁrms from Prowess for the years 1991-2002.
Year IPOS Number of Newly Public Firms Bankruptcies % Bankruptcies
1991 16 16 0 0
1992 62 79 0 0
1993 137 219 0 0
1994 343 567 0 0
1995 393 971 2 0.21
1996 159 1,096 11 1.00
1997 6 1,029 19 1.85
1998 3 958 38 3.97
1999 8 963 54 5.61
2000 56 904 55 6.08
2001 6 645 43 6.67
2002 0 197 9 4.57
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Table VIII: The Post-Collapse Performance of Newly Public Firms
This table estimates the impact of the equity market’s collapse on the post-IPO performance of newly public ﬁrms
relative to the post-IPO performance of other public ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, we estimate the following OLS regression with
both ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and year dummies: 푦푖푡 = 훽0+푠푢푚
2
푠=0Γ푠Post-IPO(s)푖푡+Γ3Post-IPO(3+)푖푡+훾[Post-IPO(1+)푖푡×
Post-1996푡] +훼푖 + 훿푡 + 휀푖푡 where Post-IPO(s) is an indicator that equals one if it is s years since the ﬁrm went public,
Post-IPO(s+) is an indicator that equals one if it is s or more years since the ﬁrm went public, and Post-1996 is
an indicator equal to one for years after 1996. In Panel A, we report the estimates for 푦푖푡 equal to Log(Sales) and
Debt/TA. In Panel B, we report the estimates for 푦푖푡 equal to EBIDTA/Sales and Bankruptcy, where Bankruptcy is
an indicator variable that equals 1 in year emph{t if the ﬁrm ﬁles for bankruptcy with the BIFR and 0 otherwise. The
IPO data is from SDC while the ﬁnancial data is from the Prowess database. The sample includes all non-Government
and non-foreign ﬁrms with assets greater than Rs. 50 million from Prowess for the years 1992-2002, but excludes
ﬁrms that undertake an IPO after 1996. The standard errors are clustered at individual ﬁrm level. ***, **, and *
indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Panel A: Sales and Leverage
Log(Sales) Debt/TA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post-IPO(1+) × Post-1996 -.095∗∗ .047∗∗∗
(.045) (.010)
Post-IPO(0) -.018 -.015 -.061∗∗∗ -.062∗∗∗
(.043) (.043) (.008) (.008)
Post IPO (1) .184∗∗∗ .201∗∗∗ -.016∗∗ -.025∗∗∗
(.043) (.044) (.008) (.008)
Post IPO (2) .311∗∗∗ .355∗∗∗ .017∗ -.005
(.044) (.050) (.009) (.010)
Post IPO (3+) .341∗∗∗ .426∗∗∗ .052∗∗∗ .010
(.050) (.061) (.011) (.012)
Firm Fixed Eﬀects X X X X
Year Fixed Eﬀects X X X X
Obs. 41030 41030 42278 42278
푅2 .863 .863 .754 .754
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Panel B: Proﬁts and Bankruptcy Rates
EBIDTA/Sales Bankruptcy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post-IPO(1+) × Post-1996 -.052∗∗ .045∗∗∗
(.022) (.009)
Post-IPO(0) -.0004 .001 .004 .003
(.016) (.015) (.005) (.005)
Post IPO (1) -.024 -.015 .0009 -.007
(.017) (.017) (.005) (.006)
Post IPO (2) -.070∗∗∗ -.046∗∗ .002 -.018∗∗
(.021) (.022) (.006) (.008)
Post IPO (3+) -.131∗∗∗ -.084∗∗∗ .022∗∗∗ -.018∗
(.022) (.027) (.008) (.010)
Firm Fixed Eﬀects X X X X
Year Fixed Eﬀects X X X X
Obs. 41030 41030 42278 42278
푅2 .421 .421 .485 .487
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Appendix I - Deﬁnitions
1. Total Assets is the book value of total assets in units of Rs. 10 million.
2. Sales is the total sales in units of Rs. 10 million.
3. Sales Growth is the growth rate of sales.
4. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of the investment in property plant and equipment to the book value of gross
ﬁxed assets.
5. EBIDTA/TA is the ratio of earnings before interest depreciation taxes and amortization to total assets.
6. EBIDTA/Sales is the ratio of earnings before interest depreciation taxes and amortization to total sales.
7. Trade Credit/Sales is the ratio of accounts payable to total sales.
8. Debt/TA is the ratio of book value of total borrowing to the book value of total assets.
9. Industry Market-to-Book is the median ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total assets of all
ﬁrms in an industry.
10. Age is ﬁrm age since incorporation measured in number of years.
11. Group is a dummy variable that takes a value 1 for ﬁrms that belong to a business group.
12. Tangibility is the ratio of the total book value of property plant and equipment to the book value of total
assets.
13. Industry Investment is the median investment by all ﬁrms in an industry, where investment is the rate of
growth of gross ﬁxed assets.
14. RZ-Index is a measure of the external-ﬁnance dependence of a ﬁrm. It is measured using the methodology of
Rajan and Zingales (1998).
15. Post-1996 IPO is a dummy variable that takes a value 1 for ﬁrms that go public after 1996 and 0 for the other
ﬁrms.
16. IPO is a dummy variable that takes a value 1 in the year in which a ﬁrm goes public
17. Post-IPO (Year i) is a dummy variable that takes a value 1 in Year 푖 after the IPO and 0 otherwise.
18. Post 1996 is a dummy variable that takes a value 1 for the period after 1996 and 0 otherwise.
19. Pr(IPO) is the predicted probability of a private ﬁrm doing an IPO.
20. Pr(SEO) is the predicted probability of a public ﬁrm doing an SEO.
21. Pr(SEO) is the predicted probability of a public ﬁrm doing an SEO.
22. Bankruptcy is an indicator variable that equals 1 in year t if the ﬁrm ﬁles for bankruptcy with the BIFR and
0 otherwise.
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h
,
(3
)
It
st
ip
u
la
te
s
th
a
t
u
n
li
st
ed
co
m
p
a
n
ie
s
ca
n
o
n
ly
fr
ee
ly
p
ri
ce
th
ei
r
se
cu
ri
ti
es
if
th
ey
h
av
e
re
p
o
rt
ed
a
n
et
p
ro
ﬁ
t
in
th
e
im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
p
re
ce
d
in
g
3
y
ea
rs
,
a
n
d
(4
),
It
re
d
u
ce
s
p
ro
m
o
te
rs
re
q
u
ir
ed
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
fr
o
m
2
5
%
to
2
0
%
fo
r
is
su
es
u
p
to
R
s.
1
b
il
li
o
n
.
W
it
h
th
e
ex
ce
p
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
ch
a
n
g
e
in
p
ro
m
o
te
rs
re
q
u
ir
em
en
t,
th
es
e
a
re
li
k
el
y
to
m
a
k
e
it
h
a
rd
er
fo
r
ﬁ
rm
s
to
is
su
e
eq
u
it
y.
S
ep
te
m
b
er
5
,
1
9
9
7
S
E
B
I
m
a
k
es
a
co
u
p
le
o
f
ch
a
n
g
es
:
(1
)
L
is
ti
n
g
n
o
rm
s
re
la
x
ed
fo
r
p
ri
-
va
te
se
ct
o
r
b
a
n
k
s
a
n
d
in
fr
a
st
ru
ct
u
re
ﬁ
rm
s
a
n
d
(2
),
In
fr
a
st
ru
ct
u
re
ﬁ
rm
s
ca
n
is
su
e
p
u
b
li
c
d
eb
t
a
n
d
co
n
v
er
ti
b
le
d
eb
t
w
it
h
o
u
t
ﬁ
rs
t
is
su
in
g
p
u
b
li
c
eq
u
it
y.
C
h
a
n
g
es
m
a
k
e
it
ea
si
er
to
is
su
e
eq
u
it
y
a
n
d
d
eb
t
fo
r
so
m
e
ﬁ
rm
s.
M
a
rc
h
2
7
,
1
9
9
8
L
o
ck
-u
p
re
q
u
ir
em
en
ts
a
re
re
la
x
ed
su
ch
th
a
t
o
n
ly
2
0
%
o
f
p
ro
m
o
te
r’
s
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
is
su
b
je
ct
to
lo
ck
-u
p
.
M
a
k
es
it
ea
si
er
to
g
o
p
u
b
li
c
fo
r
ﬁ
rm
s
w
it
h
p
ro
m
o
te
rs
th
a
t
w
is
h
to
ex
it
th
e
ﬁ
rm
.
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